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Honorable Michael E. Keasler**
I. INTRODUCTION
This article summarizes and analyzes cases decided by the U.S. Su-
preme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals during the Survey
period, which spans from December 1, 2016, to November 30, 2017.
In Subpart II, this article will address confessions jurisprudence, which
experienced no significant changes during the Survey period. Subpart III
will then survey search and seizure jurisprudence, which shifted signifi-
cantly. Most notably, the Court of Criminal Appeals applied long-stand-
ing Fourth Amendment principles to cell phone technology. The court
also addressed the nuances of several warrant exceptions, the private-
party-search doctrine, and consensual interactions with law enforcement.
The U.S. Supreme Court altered the Fourth Amendment landscape, re-
jecting U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit case law that gov-
erned pre-trial detention claims.
II. CONFESSIONS
The law of confessions is governed by the Fifth Amendment, which
institutes procedural safeguards that protect suspects who undergo custo-
dial interrogation by law enforcement.1 Custodial interrogation refers to
“questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been . . . deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”2 The
U.S. Supreme Court opined in Miranda v. Arizona that, before initiating
this type of questioning, law enforcement must admonish the suspect
“that he has [the] right to remain silent, that any statement he . . . make[s]
may be used . . . against him, and that he has [the] right to . . . an attor-
ney.”3 The suspect may waive these rights, so long as his waiver is volun-
tary.4 But, “[i]f . . . he indicates in any manner” that he wishes to invoke
* Benjamin S. Brown is a Briefing Attorney for Judge Michael E. Keasler. He gradu-
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1. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
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these rights, law enforcement must immediately end the interrogation.5 If
law enforcement fails to properly warn a suspect or ignores his invocation
of these rights, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.22 provides
that any subsequent evidence discovered during the questioning is
inadmissible.6
Because neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the Texas Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals decided any significant confessions cases during the Survey
period, this Subpart will briefly survey Texas courts of appeals cases that
applied well-settled Fifth Amendment jurisprudence to novel factual
scenarios.
A. INVOKING THE RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY
In State v. Norris, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals evaluated
how a suspect must invoke his right to an attorney.7 In this case, appellee,
Eric Cornelius Norris, Jr., was being questioned regarding a murder.8 The
detectives read Norris his Miranda rights and questioned him for over an
hour.9 Norris then stated that he wanted to make a phone call, but he was
interrupted by the detective, who refused to allow Norris to make a call
until he was done asking questions.10 According to the trial court’s tran-
script of the interrogation, Norris then stated: “Well, give me a lawyer or
something . . . .” After this exchange, the interrogation continued, and
Norris admitted to the murder.11
Norris moved to suppress his confession, claiming that the continued
questioning after he invoked his right to an attorney violated his Miranda
rights.12 The trial judge agreed, suppressing all statements made after
Norris mentioned that he wanted an attorney.13 But the court of appeals
reversed.14 Conducting its own examination of the recording of Norris’s
interview, the court of appeals determined that his actual statement was:
“I just want to make a phone call and call my sister and see if she could
. . . go get me a lawyer . . . .”15 The court determined that Norris’s state-
ment was “forward-looking”—he was not claiming that he wanted coun-
sel at that moment, but rather speculating that he may want counsel at
some point in the future.16 The court held that this statement was not
“unequivocal” or “unambiguous” such that the police would understand
5. Id. at 444–45.
6. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, §§ 2–3 (West 2018).
7. See State v. Norris, 541 S.W.3d 862, 865 –67 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2017, pet. ref’d).
8. Id. at 864.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 865.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 866.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 867.
15. Id. at 866.
16. Id. at 867.
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Norris wanted to consult an attorney at that time.17 The court also refer-
enced Norris’s statement just before this exchange, when he indicated he
was “okay” speaking to the police.18 Thus, considering the totality of the
circumstances, the court ruled that Norris did not sufficiently invoke his
right to attorney, and his admission was admissible.19
B. SPONTANEOUS ADMISSIONS
In Kennard v. State, the First Houston Court of Appeals also clarified
the interaction between Miranda warnings and spontaneous statements.20
In this case, appellant, Jonathan Kennard was convicted of the murder of
Lester Williams.21 Williams was shot to death in the parking lot of a
nightclub in Harris County.22 When the police detained Kennard in con-
nection with the murder, they issued Miranda warnings and asked if he
was willing to talk.23 He assented.24 The officers then asked if Kennard
understood his Miranda rights and truly wanted to waive them.25 Ken-
nard responded: “No, I really would like a lawyer but I don’t know what’s
going on, my man, like, at all, I don’t. I know I left at a certain time. So I
only stayed in there for a few minutes.”26
Kennard moved to suppress the statements he made during and after
this exchange, alleging that he had invoked his right to an attorney but
the officers had continued questioning him in violation of Miranda.27 The
trial court denied his motion, and the court of appeals affirmed.28 The
court of appeals reasoned that Kennard’s invocation of his right to an
attorney and his admission that he was at the scene of the crime on the
night of the murder were one, seamless statement.29 Further, his admis-
sion was not “in response to . . . [a] question posed” by “the officers”—he
made this statement “spontaneously.”30 Thus, this statement was not “the
product of words or actions on the part of the police that they should
have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.”31
The admission was therefore not a product of “interrogation,” not enti-




20. See Kennard v. State, No. 01-16-00984-CR, 2017 WL 5623583, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 21, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
21. Id. at *1.
22. Id.
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III. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, closely mirrored by
Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution, protects individuals from
unreasonable searches and seizures.33 The U.S. Supreme Court has de-
scribed this amendment as “sacred,” “inestimable,” and “carefully
guarded,” for it codifies the right “to the possession and control of [one’s]
own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by
clear and unquestionable authority of law.”34 This constitutional provi-
sion has provided the basis for probable cause, reasonable suspicion, fruit
of the poisonous tree, and many other prophylactic legal doctrines.
Though expansive, the Fourth Amendment is not limitless. An accused
may only invoke its protections if he can demonstrate “an actual . . . ex-
pectation of privacy . . . that society is prepared to [deem] . . . ‘reasona-
ble.’”35 This amendment’s warrant requirement is also subject to a
number of exceptions, such as exigent circumstances36 and plain view.37
And, as the legal landscape changes, the prophylactic doctrines supported
by this amendment also change. So, U.S. Supreme Court and Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals jurisprudence from the Survey period explores the
outer bounds of the Fourth Amendment and its Texas corollary, deter-
mining whether novel circumstances and modern technologies may enjoy
their protections.
A. CELL PHONES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The advent of cell phones has generated a new niche of search and
seizure doctrine. Because these devices are so novel, they do not have a
perfect legal analog (such as envelopes, landline phones, or email),38 and
therefore present many unanticipated privacy questions. Perhaps the
most significant of these questions is whether, or to what extent, cell
phone users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information
that their devices transmit. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals grap-
pled with this issue in several recent cases.
1. Love v. State
In Love v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals determined that
individuals do have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their text
messages, even though these messages are conveyed to and stored by cell
phone service providers.39 This decision was issued soon after another
landmark Texas ruling, Ford v. State, which established that individuals
33. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9.
34. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1968); Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250,
251 (1891).
35. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
36. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011).
37. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971).
38. See Love v. State, 543 S.W.3d 835, 843–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
39. Id. at 845.
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do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell site location
information (CSLI).40
In Love, the appellant, Albert Love, appealed his conviction for the
murders of Keenan Hubert and Tynus Sneed.41 Love complained that the
trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to suppress his cell
phone records, including his subscriber information, call logs, location in-
formation, and text messages.42 The State obtained these records via
court order but without a search warrant.43 Love argued that this consti-
tuted an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.44
The crux of this case was whether Love maintained a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in these records, for this would determine whether they
were protected by the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. The
court began with the standard articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Katz v. United States: “What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area ac-
cessible to the public, . . . may be constitutionally protected.”45 This doc-
trine begets a two-step analysis, in which a court must determine (1)
whether the person “exhibited an actual . . . expectation of privacy”; and
(2) whether this expectation is “one that society” would “recognize as
reasonable or justifiable.”46
The court then noted that information conveyed to third parties does
not typically enjoy Fourth Amendment protections, since such disclosure
defeats the first step of the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis.47
And, in this case, Love had effectively disclosed his cell phone records to
a third party by conveying them to Metro PCS, his internet service pro-
vider (ISP), and allowing the company to store these records on its serv-
ers.48 The court also acknowledged precedent holding that the Fourth
Amendment does not protect call logs49 and CSLI50 because they are in-
variably disclosed to service providers. Thus, the court held that the State
did not need a search warrant to acquire these aspects of Love’s cell
phone records.51
40. Ford v. State, 477 S.W.3d 321, 330 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
41. Love, 543 S.W.3d at 838.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 839–40.
44. Id. at 840.
45. See id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
46. Id. at 840–41.
47. Id. at 841.
48. Id.
49. See id. (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–45 (1979)).
50. See id. (citing Ford v. State, 477 S.W.3d 321, 329–30 & nn.5–7 (Tex. Crim. App.
2015)).
51. Id. But see Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (decided after the
Survey period) (holding that, under the Fourth Amendment, “an individual maintains a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured
through CSLI”).
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But the court determined that Love’s text messages demanded more
protection. The U.S. Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between
CSLI and the contents of cell phone communications,52 and the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the search and seizure of a cell
phone requires a search warrant.53 And though it may be argued that
Love waived his expectation of privacy by conveying these messages to
his service provider, the court determined that the disclosure itself was
not enough—the purpose and nature of the disclosure were dispositive.54
The court grounded its reasoning in United States v. Warshak, a U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit case holding that disclosure of
email content to an ISP does not defeat the expectation of privacy.55 The
Sixth Circuit likened emails transmitted by ISP’s to envelopes delivered
by the postal service.56
The Court of Criminal Appeals extended this analogy to text messages,
holding that the key distinction is “whether the information was volunta-
rily disclosed to the third party for a specific business-related purpose,
such as routing information, or merely transmitted using the services of
the third party service provider.”57 Mere transmission, the court deter-
mined, does not defeat the expectation of privacy.58 Thus, because the
State did not demonstrate that Metro PCS had a “specific business-re-
lated purpose” for storing the contents of its customers’ text messages,
Love’s messages were protected by the Fourth Amendment and the State
was required to secure a search warrant before obtaining them.59
2. Hankston v. State
In Hankston v. State, the appellant, Gareic Hankston, appealed his
murder conviction.60 Hankston argued on appeal that the trial court erro-
neously denied his motion to suppress his cell phone records—specifi-
cally, his call logs and CSLI.61 Because the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals initially decided in Ford62 and reaffirmed in Love63 that call logs
and CSLI that have been disclosed to third parties are not protected by
the Fourth Amendment, the court declined to entertain this claim.64 But,
the court did consider Hankston’s novel claim that Article I, Section 9 of
the Texas Constitution affords greater search and seizure protections than
the Fourth Amendment and thus imposes a warrant requirement on the
52. Id. (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979)).
53. Id. (citing State v. Granville, 423 S.W.3d 399, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)).
54. Id. at 843.
55. Id. at 842.
56. See id. (citing United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285 (6th Cir. 2010)).
57. Id. at 843.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 844.
60. Hankston v. State, 517 S.W.3d 112, 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
61. Id. at 112.
62. See id. at 120 (citing Ford v. State, 477 S.W.3d 321, 330 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)).
63. See id. (citing Love v. State, 543 S.W.3d 835, 841 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 7, 2016)).
64. Id. at 113.
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acquisition of call logs and CSLI.65
To support this claim, Hankston cited heavily to Richardson v. State.66
In that case, the Court of Criminal Appeals examined “whether the . . .
use of a pen register by law enforcement . . . required probable cause.”67
The court recognized that Article I, Section 9 and the Fourth Amend-
ment offer substantially similar protections and serve essentially the same
purpose: to protect individuals from unreasonable government searches
and seizures.68 The court also acknowledged Smith v. Maryland and
United States v. Miller, two U.S. Supreme Court cases holding that the
installation of a pen register did not constitute a “search” for Fourth
Amendment purposes.69 However, the Court of Criminal Appeals de-
clined to follow this precedent and held that the Texas Constitution inde-
pendently recognizes a privacy interest in the numbers an individual dials
from their telephone.70 Thus, a pen register did constitute a “search”
within the meaning of Article I, Section 9.71
But the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals declined to follow the Rich-
ardson court in Hankston. The court first recognized that the Fourth
Amendment and Article I, Section 9 contain nearly identical language
and ostensibly serve the same purpose.72 The court then noted that, al-
though it was not required to apply U.S. Supreme Court interpretations
of the Fourth Amendment to the Texas Constitution, it could elect to do
so, and in fact had only deviated from the Supreme Court on a handful of
occasions.73 Finally, the court emphasized that it had, in two prior cases,
addressed similar issues and determined that the Fourth Amendment and
Article I, Section 9 offered the same search and seizure protections.74 The
court admonished that it would “stretch judicial credibility to the break-
ing point . . . to hold that what ‘makes more sense’ for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment does not also ‘make more sense’ under our [Texas]
. . . constitutional analog.”75 For these reasons, the court held that Article
I, Section 9, like the Fourth Amendment, does not recognize a privacy
interest in call logs or CSLI.76
65. See id.
66. See id. at 116 (citing Richardson v. State, 865 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)).
67. Id. at 117.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 117–18 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); U.S. v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435 (1976)).
70. Id. at 118.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 116.
73. Id. at 116–17.
74. See id. at 119 (citing Johnson v. State, 912 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995);
Crittenden v. State, 899 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)).
75. Id. (quoting Crittenden, 899 S.W.2d at 673).
76. See id. at 122. But see Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018)
(decided after the Survey period) (holding that, under the Fourth Amendment, “an indi-
vidual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical move-
ments as captured through CSLI”).
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B. EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
The U.S. Supreme Court has historically emphasized the importance of
“adher[ing] to judicial processes”77 and interposing “the deliberate, im-
partial judgment of a judicial officer . . . between the citizen and the po-
lice.”78 The Court has thus interpreted the Fourth Amendment to require
a warrant, approved by a judge or magistrate, to authorize all searches
that do not fall within “a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.”79 During the Survey period, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals issued several opinions exploring the nuances of these often-liti-
gated exceptions.
1. Search Incident to Arrest
The “search incident to arrest” exception to the warrant requirement
allows police officers to search an arrestee in conjunction with a lawful
arrest.80 The purpose of this doctrine is to allow officers to seize weapons
or other dangerous items that could be used to resist or escape law en-
forcement, and to seize and preserve evidence.81 However, this exception
only applies to searches that are “‘substantially contemporaneous’ with
the arrest and . . . confined to the area within the immediate control of
the arrestee.”82 This doctrine will not justify a search that is attenuated
from the arrest or otherwise conducted when no exigent circumstances
exist.83
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered this exception in State
v. Sanchez.84 In Sanchez, a police officer found appellee, Reinaldo
Sanchez, asleep in the driver’s seat of his car, parked in a grassy area by a
bar.85 The officer discovered that Sanchez had several outstanding traffic
warrants and subsequently arrested him.86 Upon a search of Sanchez’s
personal effects, the officer discovered cocaine.87 The officer then
searched Sanchez’s car and found more cocaine in the passenger seat.88
Sanchez filed a motion to suppress, which was granted as to the cocaine
found in his car.89 The trial court found that “[t]he officer did not have
probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained evidence of a crime
before the search of the Defendant’s vehicle,” and that “[t]here existed
no reason to believe that evidence of the traffic violations for which there
was a warrant authorizing the Defendant’s arrest by the police officer[ ]
77. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
78. Wong Son v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481–82 (1963).
79. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).




84. See State v. Sanchez, 538 S.W.3d 545, 548 –551 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
85. Id. at 546.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 546–47.
88. Id. at 547.
89. Id.
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might be found in the vehicle.”90 The State appealed this decision, argu-
ing that the search of Sanchez’s car “was a valid search incident to ar-
rest.”91 However, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals affirmed, holding
that the “offense of arrest” was dispositive.92 Sanchez was initially ar-
rested for traffic offenses, and because the officer could not reasonably
believe that he would find evidence of these offenses in Sanchez’s vehicle,
his search of the vehicle was not justified.93
But the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed.94 The court first empha-
sized that the search of a vehicle incident to arrest is authorized only in
two situations: “(1) when the arrestee is unsecured and the area of the
vehicle is within his immediate control, or (2) ‘when it is reasonable to
believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehi-
cle.’”95 Noting that only the second scenario was relevant in this case, the
court looked to the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Thornton v. United
States for guidance.96 In that case, the defendant was initially stopped for
invalid license tags, but after the police officer searched his personal ef-
fects and discovered illegal drugs, the defendant was arrested for drug
possession.97 The officer then searched the defendant’s car and found a
handgun.98 Justice Scalia’s concurrence, adopted by the Court in Arizona
v. Gant,99 found that the search of the vehicle incident to arrest was valid
because the defendant “was lawfully arrested for a drug offense,” and the
officer could have reasonably believed that evidence of this offense
would be found in the defendant’s car.100 It was irrelevant to the search
that the defendant had originally been stopped for faulty license tags.101
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals interpreted this decision to mean
that the formalities of the arrest are not dispositive of a “search-incident-
to-arrest” issue.102 It does not matter, the court held, which offense was
discovered first or which actions formed the basis for the offense of ar-
rest, so long as law enforcement developed probable cause to believe the
defendant committed the relevant crime before the search occurred.103
Thus, Sanchez’s initial arrest for traffic violations was not fatal to the
search of his vehicle.104 The officer developed probable cause for a drug
offense upon searching Sanchez’s personal effects, and, because the of-
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 547–48 (citing State v. Sanchez, 501 S.W.3d 165, 170–71 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi 2016), rev’d, 538 S.W.3d 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017)).
93. Id. at 548.
94. See id. at 551.
95. Id. at 548 (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009)).
96. See id. (citing Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 615, 618 (2004)).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. (citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009)).
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 549.
103. See id.
104. Id. at 551.
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ficer could have reasonably believed that further evidence of a drug crime
was in the vehicle, the subsequent search was justified.105
2. Exigent Circumstances and Plain View
In Ricks v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals elaborated upon
two significant warrant exceptions: exigent circumstances and plain
view.106 The exigent circumstances exception validates a warrantless
search when law enforcement has probable cause and one of three cate-
gories of exigent circumstances exists: “1) providing aid or assistance to
persons whom law enforcement reasonably believes are in need of assis-
tance; 2) protecting police officers from persons whom they reasonably
believe to be present, armed, and dangerous; and 3) preventing the de-
struction of evidence or contraband.”107 This exception often interacts
with the plain view exception, for “the police may seize any evidence that
is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activi-
ties.”108 An object falls within the plain view exception when the officer is
lawfully present in a place where the object may be seen, the incriminat-
ing nature of the object is apparent, and the officer has “the right to ac-
cess the object.”109
In Ricks, the appellant, Cedric Allen Ricks, stabbed his girlfriend, Rox-
ann Sanchez, and her son, Anthony Figueroa, to death in their apart-
ment.110 Ricks also attacked Sanchez’s eldest son, Marcus Figueroa, but
he survived.111 Sanchez’s infant son, Isaiah, was unharmed.112 Ricks then
fled the scene and called his cousin, Tamara Butts, to confess his
crimes.113 Butts alerted the police, who dispatched several officers to the
apartment.114 Officer Baxley arrived first, and as he waited for backup,
Marcus called 911 from inside the apartment and reported that his
mother and brother had been murdered.115 Baxley was instructed to call
Marcus to the apartment’s landing, and the two waited in front of the
apartment until backup arrived.116 Officers Bowen, Crowell, and Scott
then arrived at the scene and entered the apartment to look for suspects
and secure the area.117 The officers found the bodies of Roxann Sanchez
and Anthony Figueroa and the murder weapon, and they observed large
amounts of blood, all in plain view.118 Several hours later, Bedford Police
105. Id.
106. See Ricks v. State, No. AP-77,040, 2017 WL 4401589, at *8–11 (Tex. Crim. App.
Oct. 4, 2017, not designated for publication).
107. Gutierrez v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
108. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978).
109. Keehn v. State, 279 S.W.3d 330, 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
110. Ricks, 2017 WL 4401589, at *1.
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Detective Joey Gauger and Crime Scene Technician Brittany Grice ar-
rived at the apartment.119 They collected the items the officers had previ-
ously seen in plain view, along with several other items that were not
observed in plain view, including bandage wrappers, a wallet, a photo-
graph, and paperwork.120 Both searches were conducted without a
warrant.121
At trial, Ricks moved to suppress all evidence found in the apart-
ment.122 The trial court granted his motion as to the items collected by
Gauger and Grice that were not in plain view, but denied as to all other
evidence.123 On appeal, Ricks argued that all evidence discovered pursu-
ant to the warrantless searches should be suppressed because, once the
first responding officers completed their sweep of the apartment, the exi-
gent circumstances had been extinguished.124 He claimed that all subse-
quent searches of the apartment required a warrant.125
The Court of Criminal Appeals first asserted that exigent circum-
stances justified the initial entry.126 The first responding officers found
Marcus, who was badly wounded and needed medical assistance.127 The
officers could also hear the baby, Isaiah, crying in the apartment, and
they were not sure whether Ricks had left the area.128 The court also held
that, although the exigent circumstances had dissipated when the subse-
quent, warrantless searches were conducted, these searches were justi-
fied.129 The court expanded upon the exigent circumstances exception,
asserting that “the right to be present is not necessarily limited to just the
officer or officers who actually dealt with the exigency that permitted the
initial entry, but may extend to officers who have a different function
from the original entrants.”130 The court emphasized that it would
“make[ ] no sense” to require subsequent officers to obtain a warrant to
complete the work of the initial responding officers.131 The court also
noted that, when an officer observes evidence in plain view, this observa-
tion destroys the owner’s privacy interest in that object.132 Law enforce-
ment may, as a result, seize that object without a warrant, even during the
course of a later search.133 Thus, all searches in Ricks were justified by
the exigent circumstances and plain view exceptions, to the extent that
119. Id. at *4.
120. Id.
121. See id. at *8.
122. Id. at *5.
123. Id.







131. Id. (quoting Johnson v. State, 161 S.W.3d 176, 183 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005),
aff’d on other grounds, 226 S.W.3d 439, 445 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
132. Id. (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983)).
133. Id.
152 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 4
the later searches did not exceed the scope of the initial sweep.134
C. ARTICLE 38.23 AND THE GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.23 (Article 38.23) pros-
cribes the admission of illegally-obtained evidence.135 However, the stat-
ute provides a “good faith” exception that allows such evidence to be
admitted when it “was obtained by a law enforcement officer acting in
objective good faith reliance upon a warrant issued by a neutral magis-
trate based on probable cause.”136 Article 38.23 also “‘mirrors’ the fed-
eral exclusionary rule,”137 and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals often
borrows from federal case law when analyzing exclusionary issues.138
However, the court will only graft federal principles into Texas law if
these principles are “‘consistent with’ the statutory language.”139
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals examined the interaction be-
tween the good-faith exception and the fruit of the poisonous tree doc-
trine in McClintock v. State.140 In this case, law enforcement took a drug-
sniffing dog to the door of McClintock’s residence.141 The dog detected
drugs, and the police used this alert as the basis for a search warrant.142
The search yielded a felony amount of marijuana.143 McClintock filed a
motion to suppress, arguing that the use of the drug-sniffing dog consti-
tuted an illegal search and that, without the dog’s alert, there was not
sufficient probable cause to support a warrant.144 The trial court denied,
holding that the drug-dog sniff did not constitute a search.145 But,
“[w]hile the case was . . . on appeal, the United States Supreme Court
decided Florida v. Jardines,” holding that the use of a drug-sniffing dog in
the curtilage of a residence does constitute a search.146
Consequently, in McClintock, the State emphasized on appeal that
Jardines had not yet been decided at the time of the search.147 The of-
ficers thus relied on legal precedent holding that a drug-dog sniff on the
curtilage of a residence was not a search, and therefore acted in good
faith when they used this evidence to obtain a warrant.148 But the First
134. Id. at *11.
135. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(a) (West 2018) (“No evidence ob-
tained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or
laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the United States of America,
shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal case.”).
136. Id. art. 38.23(b).
137. McClintock v. State, 541 S.W.3d 63, 66 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (citing Miles v.
State, 241 S.W.3d 28, 32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
138. See id. at 68.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 69–70.





146. Id. (citing Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013)).
147. Id.
148. Id.
2018] Criminal Procedure: Confessions, Searches, and Seizures 153
Houston Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that Article 38.23’s good-
faith exception requires that the evidence is obtained pursuant to a war-
rant that is “based on probable cause.”149 Per the fruit of the poisonous
tree doctrine, the drug-dog sniff could not be included in the probable
cause calculus because it constituted an illegal search.150 Further, the
court held that the other evidence, excluding the drug-dog sniff, did not
constitute probable cause, and thus the warrant was invalid.151
The Court of Criminal Appeals set out to determine if the Texas Legis-
lature, in drafting Article 38.23, intended “the good-faith exception . . .
[to] apply only to . . . the illegal acquisition of evidence” based upon a
warrant supported by probable cause, or if the exception may also protect
searches predicated upon warrants that are themselves tainted by police
misconduct.152 Because the U.S. Supreme Court had not yet addressed
this issue, the court surveyed case law from an array of federal circuits to
guide its decision.153 The court found the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Massi to be particularly persua-
sive.154 In Massi, the Fifth Circuit held that the good-faith exception to
the federal exclusionary rule may apply to a tainted warrant if two crite-
ria are satisfied:
(1) [T]he prior law enforcement conduct that uncovered evidence
used in the affidavit for the warrant [is] “close enough to the line of
validity” that an objectively reasonable officer preparing the affida-
vit or executing the warrant would believe that the information sup-
porting the warrant[ ] was not tainted by unconstitutional conduct,
and (2) the resulting search warrant [is] sought and executed by a
law enforcement officer in good faith . . . .155
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found this articulation of the rule
to be an “acceptable synthesis of the federal case law.”156 Further, the
court determined that the language of Article 38.23 was broad enough to
integrate this rule into Texas law.157 The court reasoned that, because
Article 38.23 accommodates the federal fruit of the poisonous tree doc-
trine, the statute should accordingly recognize the application of its good-
faith exception to this doctrine.158
Applying this newly-minted rule to the facts at hand, the court deter-
mined that the good-faith exception rescued the validity of the search
warrant.159 The court emphasized that, before Jardines, a drug-dog sniff
in the curtilage of a residence was ostensibly legal because drug dogs only
149. Id. at 66.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 67.
153. See id. at 68–72.
154. See id. at 72.
155. Id. (quoting United States v. Massi, 761 F.3d 512, 528 (5th Cir. 2014)).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 72–73.
159. Id. at 74.
154 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 4
detect contraband, and individuals do not retain a privacy interest in
these items.160 Further, even after Jardines, the law on this topic remains
muddled, as it is unclear what exactly constitutes the “curtilage” of a resi-
dence.161 Thus, at the time the officers executed the drug-dog sniff, this
conduct was “close enough to the line of validity” such “that an objec-
tively reasonable officer . . . would . . . believe” his conduct was legal.162
D. THE PRIVATE-PARTY-SEARCH DOCTRINE
The private-party-search doctrine emanates from the fact that the
Fourth Amendment applies only to the government—not to private ac-
tors.163 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that this amendment “was not
intended to be a limitation upon” private citizens, even when those citi-
zens wrongfully seize another’s property.164 But a private-party search
may, in limited circumstances, frustrate the owner’s privacy interests in
such a way that a subsequent, warrantless search by the government does
not offend the Fourth Amendment.165 But the subsequent government
search must be limited to the scope of the initial, private-party search—if
the government “change[s] the nature of the search” or conducts an “ad-
ditional search,” then a warrant is required.166
In State v. Rodriguez, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals declined to
extend the private-party-search doctrine to the search of a residence.167
In this case, appellee, Mikenzie Renee Rodriguez, was a student at How-
ard Payne University who rented a dorm room on campus.168 When resi-
dent assistants (RA’s) performed a routine search of her room, they
found marijuana, pills, and a pipe.169 The RA’s laid these items on the
floor, took pictures of them, and then contacted their resident director,
Nancy Pryor, who called the Howard Payne Police.170 Officer Pacatte re-
sponded, and Pryor took him to Rodriguez’s room.171 Pacatte then called
Brownwood Detective Joe Aaron Taylor to the scene, and the two of-
ficers confiscated the contraband without a warrant.172
Rodriguez filed a motion to suppress, and the trial court granted, find-
ing that the warrantless search of the dorm room did not fall into a war-
rant exception and violated the Fourth Amendment.173 On appeal, the




163. See State v. Rodriguez, 521 S.W.3d 1, 10–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
164. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
165. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115–16 (1984).
166. Id. at 116 (quoting Walter v. U.S., 447 U.S. 649, 663–64 (1980)).
167. See Rodriguez, 521 S.W.3d at 13.
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ficers’ conduct did not constitute a search because Rodriguez’s privacy
interests had already been extinguished by the private-party search con-
ducted by the RA’s.174 But the Eastland Court of Appeals ruled for Rod-
riguez, holding that the dorm room was her residence, the officer’s entry
constituted a search, and the appellee enjoyed the protections of the
Fourth Amendment in her dorm room, regardless of the university’s “su-
pervisory powers.”175
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals first established that “a dorm
room is “a home away from home” and thus a residence protected by the
Fourth Amendment.176 The court then addressed the private-party-search
doctrine by reviewing how this principle applies in other cases.177 For ex-
ample, the court noted that this doctrine may permit law enforcement to
acquire a suspect’s medical records after a hospital has drawn their
blood.178 However, this doctrine would not allow the government to con-
duct a second blood draw simply because a private actor had executed
the first one.179 The court also recounted the facts of United States v. Ja-
cobsen, a U.S. Supreme Court case in which Federal Express employees
opened a box, unwrapped its contents, and discovered cocaine.180 The
employees contacted the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),
and when an agent arrived, he could plainly see the cocaine without fur-
ther manipulating the box.181 The Court held that the agent did not in-
fringe upon the owner’s privacy interests by inspecting the box because
the owner’s reasonable expectation of privacy had already been extin-
guished by the private-party search.182 The Court also asserted that there
is no legal interest in privately possessing cocaine, and thus the chemical
tests conducted by the DEA did not reveal an “arguably private fact”
that exceeded the scope of the initial private-party search.183
However, the Court in Jacobsen asserted, and the Texas Court of Crim-
inal Appeals in Rodriguez agreed, that the private-party-search doctrine
is limited in its applicability.184 The Jacobsen majority cautioned that it
would not “sanction warrantless searches of closed or covered containers
or packages whenever probable cause exists as a result of a prior private
search.”185 Extrapolating from this, the court reasoned that a residence is
essentially a locked container that imbues its owner with “a reasonable
expectation of privacy.”186 And, while a private-party search may detract
174. Id.
175. Id. at 7–8.
176. Id. at 9.
177. See id. at 10–11.
178. Id. at 12.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 11–12 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984)).
181. Id. at 11–12.
182. Id. at 12.
183. Id. (quoting Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123).
184. Id. at 12–13.
185. Id. (quoting Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 120 n.17).
186. Id. at 13.
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from this expectation, it cannot vitiate it altogether.187 As Justice Scalia
mused in O’Connor v. Ortega: “A man enjoys Fourth Amendment pro-
tection in his home, for example, even though his wife and children have
the run of the place—and indeed, even though his landlord has the right
to conduct unannounced inspections at any time.”188 Thus, even though
Rodriguez agreed via her housing contract that the university may con-
duct surprise inspections of her “home,” this did not constitute a waiver
of her Fourth Amendment rights.189 Further, the RAs’ search did not
frustrate her privacy interests, and the police officers were required to
obtain a warrant before searching her belongings.190
E. CONSENSUAL ENCOUNTERS, ARRESTS, AND DETENTIONS
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from the unreasonable
seizure of their “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”191 The “seizure of
a person” can take many forms, including a temporary investigative de-
tention, arrest, or imprisonment, as distinguished from a consensual en-
counter with the police, which does not trigger Fourth Amendment
protections.192 Thus, a crucial issue in search and seizure jurisprudence is
whether a seizure actually took place. If it is determined that a seizure
was indeed executed, then a court must evaluate whether this seizure was
“reasonable” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.193 Both the
U.S. Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have re-
cently clarified their jurisprudence in this area.
1. Consensual Interaction with the Police
In Shimko v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals elaborated
upon the difference between a consensual encounter and an investigative
detention.194 In this case, appellant, Joseph Timothy Shimko, drove to the
parking lot of Little Woodrow’s, a bar, to pick up his friend, Scott Wil-
liamson.195 Williamson was too drunk to drive and had called Shimko to
ask for a ride home.196 When Shimko entered the parking lot, he ob-
served Williamson alongside a police officer, Deputy Ford.197 Ford had
noticed that Williamson was struggling to keep his balance, and was ac-
companying him to ensure his safety.198 Deputy Ford observed Shimko
187. See id. at 14 (“[T]he existence of a housing agreement that allows routine inspec-
tions . . . does not render the Fourth Amendment inapplicable.”).
188. Id. (quoting O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 730 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
189. See id. at 14–15.
190. See id.
191. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
192. See Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 49–50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
193. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (proscribing only “unreasonable searches and
seizures”).
194. See Shimko v. State, No. PD-1639-15, 2017 WL 604065, at *3–4 (Tex. Crim. App.
Feb. 15, 2017).
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drive by several times, and Williamson indicated to Ford that Shimko’s
vehicle was his ride home.199 The officer then raised his hand and waved
so that Shimko would stop.200 When Shimko rolled down his window and
spoke to Deputy Ford, Ford smelled alcohol.201 Officers Ford and Turner
then arrested Shimko for driving while intoxicated.202
Shimko moved to suppress all evidence gathered by the officers after
Ford stopped his vehicle.203 The trial court denied, holding that Shimko’s
interaction with Ford was a consensual encounter that did not trigger
Fourth Amendment protections.204 On appeal, Shimko argued that his
encounter with Ford constituted an investigative detention because Ford
used his authority to compel Shimko to stop his vehicle.205 But the Austin
Court of Appeals determined that the record did not support this posi-
tion, and thus Shimko had failed to satisfy his burden to prove that the
encounter was not consensual.206
The Court of Criminal Appeals began by stating that the purpose of
the Fourth Amendment is not to entirely preclude interactions between
citizens and the police, but rather to “prevent arbitrary and oppressive
interference . . . with the privacy and personal security of individuals.”207
Thus, a defendant, when moving to suppress evidence, carries the burden
to rebut the presumption of lawful police conduct.208 He must first prove
that a seizure, rather than a consensual encounter, occurred, and further
prove that this seizure was unreasonable.209 The court explained that a
consensual encounter does not invoke Fourth Amendment protections
because the citizen is free to terminate the interaction at any time.210 The
court then noted that “there are no ‘per se rules’” when determining if
the interaction between a citizen and police officer is consensual.211 This
analysis asks whether, given the totality of the circumstances, a reasona-
ble person in the citizen’s shoes would believe he was free to leave.212
The court did, however, recognize several benchmarks that could guide
its analysis.213 The court acknowledged that a seizure only occurs “when
the implication arises that an officer’s authority cannot be ignored,
avoided, or ended.”214 Examples of the assertion of authority include the
officer displaying a weapon, physically touching a citizen, using command
199. Id.
200. Id.
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words or an intimidating tone of voice, flashing lights, or blocking a citi-
zen’s vehicle.215 But the court emphasized that these indicators are not
dispositive and must be interpreted in light of the “time, place, and at-
tendant circumstances.”216
Turning to the facts of this case, the court decided that Deputy Ford
never asserted his authority such that a seizure occurred.217 Although
Ford did wave at Shimko to persuade him to stop, the court concluded
the record was devoid of any evidence that Shimko was not free to ignore
the officer and drive away.218 And, although a traffic stop is typically a
seizure, this did not constitute a traffic stop because the officer did not
compel Shimko to stop—Shimko engaged with the officer of his own ac-
cord.219 Further, the court clarified that it had not and would not estab-
lish a bright-line rule that a seizure occurs any time a police officer halts a
vehicle.220 The court opined that such a rule would unnecessarily burden
the police and impinge upon the consensual encounters that are often so
crucial to law enforcement investigations.221
2. Pre-Trial Detention
The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that a claim challenging pre-
trial detention is governed by the Fourth Amendment.222 The Court has
determined that this amendment “was tailored explicitly for the criminal
justice system, and its balance between individual and public interests al-
ways has been thought to define the ‘process that is due’ for seizures of
person or property . . . including the detention of suspects pending
trial.”223 However, there has been some debate about whether a pre-trial
detention claim may also be brought under the auspices of Fifth Amend-
ment due process.224 While a majority of federal circuits have rejected
this proposition, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
embraced it, holding that, once a person has been detained, “the Fourth
Amendment falls out of the picture.”225 But the U.S. Supreme Court re-
cently overruled this line of Seventh Circuit cases, opining that pre-trial
detention is solely a Fourth Amendment issue.226
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218. Id. at *6.
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In Manuel v. City of Joliet, petitioner Elijah Manuel was pulled over by
the police for failure to signal.227 The officers forcibly removed Manuel
from the car and assaulted him as he was lying on the ground.228 They
then searched Manuel’s personal effects and confiscated a vitamin bottle
containing pills.229 The pills tested negative for any controlled substance,
but the officers arrested Manuel nonetheless.230 An evidence technician
also tested the pills, which once again yielded no trace of contraband, but
the technician lied in his report, claiming that the pills tested positive for
ecstasy.231 This report was used to charge Manuel with unlawful posses-
sion of a controlled substance.232 Manuel was then brought before a
county judge who, relying solely upon the officer’s untruthful criminal
complaint, determined there was probable cause to detain Manuel pend-
ing trial.233 The police laboratory eventually tested the pills once again,
discovered they were innocuous, and the charges were dismissed—but by
the time Manuel was released, he had spent forty-eight days in jail.234
Manuel brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit against the City of Joliet
and several police officers, complaining that they violated his Fourth
Amendment rights by arresting and detaining him without probable
cause.235 But the district court dismissed Manuel’s suit, holding that the
Fourth Amendment could not accommodate a claim of unlawful pre-trial
detention.236 The court reasoned that, once the “legal process” had be-
gun, only the Due Process Clause could provide the basis for relief.237
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.238
The U.S. Supreme Court first asserted that the Fourth Amendment
protects against unreasonable seizures, including the “seizure” of a per-
son via detention or arrest.239 The Court also noted that this amendment
prevents law enforcement from detaining citizens without reasonable sus-
picion or probable cause.240 Thus, the detention of which Manuel com-
plained was the very type of injustice that the Fourth Amendment
proscribes.241 The timing of the legal process, the Court held, is irrele-
vant, and cannot vitiate a suspect’s Fourth Amendment claim, nor trans-
form his claim into one of due process.242
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IV. CONCLUSION
The most significant change in search and seizure doctrine during the
Survey period was the application of Fourth Amendment principles to
cell phone technology. Courts in Texas and across the country are still
exploring this nascent area of the law, crafting jurisprudence that recon-
ciles antiquated legal principles with rapidly-changing technologies.243
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals also curtailed the private-party-
search doctrine, expanded several exceptions to the warrant requirement,
and reinforced the difference between consensual encounters with the
police and “seizures” that trigger Fourth Amendment protections. The
U.S. Supreme Court also reaffirmed the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment to claims of illegal detention. Confessions jurisprudence,
however, exhibited no notable changes.
243. See, e.g., Hankston v. State, 517 S.W.3d 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Love v. State,
543 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. Crim App. 2016).
